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Abstract—The Syria conflict has been described as the most
socially mediated in history, with online social media playing
a particularly important role. At the same time, the ever-
changing landscape of the conflict leads to difficulties in applying
analytical approaches taken by other studies of online political
activism. Therefore, in this paper, we use an approach that
does not require strong prior assumptions or the proposal of
an advance hypothesis to analyze Twitter and YouTube activity
of a range of protagonists to the conflict, in an attempt to
reveal additional insights into the relationships between them.
By means of a network representation that combines multiple
data views, we uncover communities of accounts falling into four
categories that broadly reflect the situation on the ground in
Syria. A detailed analysis of selected communities within the anti-
regime categories is provided, focusing on their central actors,
preferred online platforms, and activity surrounding “real world”
events. Our findings indicate that social media activity in Syria
is considerably more convoluted than reported in many other
studies of online political activism, suggesting that alternative
analytical approaches can play an important role in this type of
scenario.
INTRODUCTION
The conflict in Syria, which has been ongoing since March
2011, has been characterized by extensive use of online
social media platforms by all sides involved [1]. For example,
YouTube is being used by a variety of alleged Syrian sources
to document and highlight events as they occur, where over
a million videos have been uploaded since January 2012
according to official figures, which in turn have received
hundreds of millions of views [2]. Consequently, this behaviour
suggests that any related studies should consider multiple
online platforms, and in this paper we analyze the activity
of a range of protagonists to the conflict on two of the most
popular platforms used, namely Twitter and YouTube. Our
primary interest is to understand the extent to which this online
activity may reflect the known situation on the ground, where
additional insights are revealed into the relationships between
the corresponding groups and factions.
In this paper, we consider the Syria conflict within the
context of studies of online political activism, where attention
is often focused upon relatively static (often mainstream)
groupings about which a considerable level of prior knowledge
is available; for example, divisions between liberal and con-
servative US communities, or mainstream European political
parties [3], [4], [5]. The static nature of these groups can
provide a certain advantage in terms of driving data sampling
strategy such as using a pre-defined set of Twitter hashtags,
or defining a specific research question such as the prediction
of electoral results using online activity. In the case of the
Syria conflict, a naı¨ve application of these standard approaches
might be to initially assume the existence of a pro/anti-regime
dichotomy. However, the constantly shifting landscape of the
conflict suggests that an alternative approach is worthy of
consideration [6]. In an effort to avoid making strong prior
assumptions or proposing an advance hypothesis, we perform
an analysis of the complex Syrian situation as follows:
1) a directed collection of Twitter data associated with
the Syria conflict that leverages existing authoritative
sources.
2) a set of groups is generated from the collected data,
where we achieve this by means of community detec-
tion within a corresponding network representation.
3) a conceptual high-level categorization of the detected
communities is proposed.
4) a detailed interpretation of selected communities is
provided, where we are particularly interested in
demonstrating the complex nature of the conflict, in
contrast to other online political environments.
To this end, we generate a unified network representation
that combines multiple data views [7], within which com-
munities of Twitter accounts are detected. Although other
studies of Syrian Twitter activity have analyzed large-scale
data sets [8], here we employ a smaller curated set of Syrian
accounts originating from a variety of Twitter lists, where we
consider these accounts as having been deemed authoritative
or interesting in some way by the list curators. A similar focus
on authoritative sources has been employed by other entities
that monitor social media activity associated with the conflict,
for example, Eliot Higgins, the maintainer of the Brown Moses
blog1, who monitors hundreds of YouTube channels daily with
a view to verifying the content of videos uploaded by a variety
of Syrian sources [9].
We find that the communities within this Syrian network
can be placed into four major categories (see Fig. 1). A detailed
analysis of three selected communities within the anti-regime
categories is provided later in this paper, focusing on their
central actors and preferred online platforms. To illustrate the
1http://brown-moses.blogspot.com
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Fig. 1: Syrian account network (652 nodes, 3,260 edges). Four major categories; Jihadist (gold, right), Kurdish (red, top),
Pro-Assad (purple, left), and Secular/Moderate opposition (blue, center). Black nodes are members of multiple communities.
Visualization was performed with the OpenOrd layout in Gephi.
contrast with the polarization analyzed in certain studies of
mainstream political activism [3], [10], the three communities
selected consist of two polar opposites, jihadist and secular
revolutionary, with the third community considerably moderate
in comparison. The analysis process includes the generation
of rankings of the preferred YouTube channels for each
community, where these channels and corresponding Freebase
topics assigned by YouTube are used to assist interpretation
while also providing a certain level of validation2. We also
consider online activity surrounding “real world” events, such
as YouTube video responses to the Ghouta chemical weapon
attack on 21 August 2013 [11]. The insights revealed in this
study confirm that alternative analytical approaches can play
a key role in studies of online activity where prior knowledge
may be scarce or unreliable.
ANALYZING ONLINE POLITICAL ACTIVISM
In this paper, we consider online activity associated with
the Syria conflict within the context of other studies of
online political activism that have focused upon relatively
static, often mainstream groupings about which a considerable
level of prior knowledge is available. This includes situa-
tions featuring a polarization effect, or others where multiple
groupings are in existence. For example, the study of US
liberal and conservative blogs by Adamic and Glance [3] found
clear separation between both communities, with noticeable
behavioral differences in terms of network density based on
links between blogs, blog content itself, and interaction with
mainstream media. They did not focus on “other” blogs, such
as those of a libertarian, independent or moderate nature (and
2http://www.freebase.com/
found few references to these from the liberal and conservative
blogs), but suggested that they could be considered in future
analysis. Progressive and conservative polarization on Twitter
was investigated by Conover et al. , where hashtags were used
to gather data leading to two network representations based on
Twitter retweets and mentions [10]. By specifically requesting
the detection of exactly two communities, polarization was
clearly observable in the retweet network. This was not the
case with analogous two-community detection within the cor-
responding mentions network, where the authors suggested
that this feature may foster cross-ideological interactions of
some nature. In both cases, increasing the number of target
communities beyond two revealed smaller politically hetero-
geneous communities rather than those of a more fine-grained
ideological structure.
Mustafaraj et al. analyzed the vocal minority (prolific tweet-
ers) and silent majority (accounts that tweeted only once)
within US Democrat and Republican Twitter supporters, gath-
ering data by searching for tweets containing the names of two
Massachusetts senate candidates [12]. They also found similar
polarized retweet communities in the vocal minority, while
at the same time, the activity of both of these communities
was consistently different to the silent majority at the oppo-
site end of the spectrum. The machine learning framework
proposed by Pennacchiotti and Popescu for the classification
of Twitter accounts was evaluated using three gold standard
data sets, including one associated with political affiliation that
was generated from lists of users who classified themselves
as either Democrat or Republican in the Twitter directories
WeFollow and Twellow [13]. Similar political affiliation on
Twitter was studied by Wong et al. , where they proposed a
method to quantify US political leaning that focused on tweets
and retweets [14]. Here, data was collected using keywords
associated with the Democrat and Republican candidates in
the 2012 presidential election. They suggested that their ap-
proach compared favourably to follower or retweet graph-
based analysis due to the difficulty in interpreting the results
of the latter. Hoang et al. also focused on Twitter political
affiliation around the time of the 2012 presidential election,
using a binary classifier (Democrat and Republican) that did
not consider “neutral” (other) affiliation [15].
Gruzd and Roy found evidence of both polarization and
non-polarization in their analysis of tweets posted prior to
the 2011 Canadian federal election [16]. In this case, tweets
were selected using a single election hashtag, and accounts
were manually classified based on affiliation with one of the
established political parties, with supporters of non-mainstream
parties being excluded. In a similar approach to that of
Conover et al. , Weber et al. studied the polarization between
Egyptian secular and Islamist accounts on Twitter [17], with a
set of seed accounts that had been manually labelled as such
being used to drive data collection. Among their findings, they
observed a certain level of polarization in the retweet network,
albeit at a lower level than that observed by Conover et al. in
the corresponding progressive and conservative network. Re-
garding online Syria activity, Morstatter et al. used a set of
Syrian hashtags in their analysis of Twitter data sampling
approaches [18]. More recently, the study of Syrian Twitter
behaviour by Lynch et al. included an analysis of macro-level
activity over time [8], using tweets from the firehose Twitter
API containing the word “Syria”, regardless of the source or
account location. Unlike the situation in the US, polarization
was not observed within the retweet network, where a number
of high-level communities both within Syria and elsewhere
were identified.
Prediction of election results has also been the focus
of studies of political social media activity. For example,
Tumasjan et al. examined the power of Twitter as a predictor
of the 2009 German elections, using tweets mentioning the six
main political parties currently in parliament at the time, along
with a selection of prominent politicians [4]. They found that
the ranking of parties generated using the volume of associated
tweets was identical to the actual ranking in the election
results, with relative volume mirroring the corresponding share
of votes received by each party. However, other commen-
tators have voiced concerns about over-estimating Twitter’s
predictive power; in particular, Jungherr et al. suggested that
if the Pirate Party (not in parliament at the time) had been
included in the analysis of Tumasjan et al. , they would instead
have won the 2009 election based on relative frequency of
mentions within tweets [5]. They discuss the requirement for
well-grounded rules when collecting data. Similarly, Metaxas
et al. found that using Twitter to predict two US elections
in 2010 generated results that were only slightly better than
chance [19].
The studies discussed above have largely focused on rel-
atively static and often mainstream political situations about
which a certain level of prior knowledge is available, for
example, activity related to supporters of US Democrats and
Republicans. This can act as a driver in the collection of large
data sets and corresponding analysis. In other situations, such
as that of the Syria conflict, current and reliable knowledge
may be lacking. Consequently, we propose that smaller-scale
studies of related online activity using methods that do not ne-
cessitate the development of (possibly incorrect) assumptions,
as is the case in this paper, are appropriate.
DATA
For the purpose of this analysis, we collected a variety
of data for a set of Twitter accounts associated with the
Syria conflict. To find relevant accounts, we made use of
the Twitter user lists feature, which is often employed by
journalists and other informed parties to curate sets of accounts
deemed to be authoritative on a particular subject. This method
has previously been shown to be successful in exploiting the
wisdom of the Twitter crowds in the search for topic experts
[20], [21]. Two approaches were taken: 1) we identified lists
of Syrian accounts by known journalists, and 2) we identified
lists containing one or more of a small number of official
accounts for recognized high-profile entities known to be active
on the ground, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham [greater Syria] (ISIS). The
latter consisted of lists curated by both Syrian and non-Syrian
journalists, academics, and Syrian entities directly involved in
the conflict.
Having aggregated the accounts from these lists into a
single set, we then proceeded to manually analyze each profile
and filter immediately identifiable accounts such as non-Syrian
media outlets and journalists, academics and think-tanks, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and charities. The inten-
tion was to specifically retain Syrian accounts that claimed to
be directly involved in events in Syria, or Syrians that were
commentating on events from abroad. Accounts whose nature
could not be ascertained, or were not publicly accessible, were
also excluded. Although there was a potential for bias to be
introduced with this process, we felt that it was preferable
to identify accounts to be excluded rather than specifying
which accounts were to be included, where we trusted the list
curators’ judgement in the case of the latter. At the same time,
it should be mentioned that any samples of online social media
activity will inevitably contain a certain level of selection bias,
regardless of the sampling strategy employed, for example, the
use of pre-defined Twitter hashtag sets or other methods [22].
Using a set of 17 Twitter lists yielded a total of 911 unique
accounts, from which a final set of 652 accounts remained
following the filtering process. Twitter data including follow-
ers, friends, tweets and list memberships were retrieved for
each of the selected accounts during October and November
2013, as limited by the Twitter API restrictions effective at
the time. 1,760,883 tweets were retrieved in total, with 21%
and 75% of these being posted in 2012 and 2013 respectively.
Follower relations between the final set of accounts yielded
30,808 links, while 175,969 mentions and 27,768 retweets
were also identified pertaining to these accounts. In addition,
Twitter list memberships were available for 647 accounts,
associated with 22,080 distinct lists. All valid YouTube URLs
were also extracted from the tweet content, and profile data was
retrieved for the corresponding video and channel (account)
identifiers using the YouTube Data API, resulting in a set of
14,629 unique channels that were directly/indirectly tweeted
by 619 unique accounts. As YouTube automatically annotates
uploaded videos with Freebase topics where possible3, we also
retrieved all available topic assignments for videos uploaded
by these channels.
METHODOLOGY
To detect communities, we created a network represen-
tation using the method proposed by Greene and Cunning-
ham [7], which was previously applied to aggregate multiple
network-based and content-based views or relations from Twit-
ter into a single unified graph. Given a data set of l different
views, the unified graph method consists of two distinct phases:
1) Neighbor identification: For each view, we compute
the similarities between every account ui and all other
accounts in that view, using an appropriate similarity
measure (in this paper we use cosine similarity, due
to the sparsity of the data matrices). We use these
similarity values to rank the other accounts relative
to ui. After repeating this process for all views,
the l resulting rankings are merged together using
SVD rank aggregation [23]. From the aggregated
ranking, we select the k highest ranked accounts
as the neighbor set of ui. This is repeated for all
accounts in the data set.
2) Unified graph construction: We then build a global
representation of the data set by constructing the
corresponding asymmetric k-nearest-neighbor graph.
That is, a directed unweighted graph where an edge
exists from account ui to uj , if uj is contained in
the neighbor set of ui. This results in a sparse unified
graph encoding the connectivity information from all
the original views, covering all accounts that were
present in one or more of those views.
In this work, we employ the unified graph approach to
combine views of Twitter accounts related to the Syria conflict,
based on information derived from both Twitter and YouTube.
This is a combination of explicit network relations, and
implicit network representations that are derived from tweet
content and Twitter lists. Specifically, we use seven Twitter-
based views constructed from the data described previously to
generate the required neighbor rankings.
1) Follows: From the unweighted directed follower
graph, construct binary account profile vectors based
on accounts whom they follow (i.e. out-going links).
2) Followed-by: From the unweighted directed follower
graph, construct binary account profile vectors based
on the accounts that follow them (i.e. incoming links).
A pair of accounts are deemed to be similar if they
are frequently “co-followed” by the same accounts.
3) Mentions: From the weighted directed mention graph,
construct account profile vectors based on the ac-
counts whom they mention.
4) Mentioned-by: From the weighted directed mention
graph, construct account profile vectors based on the
accounts that mention them. A pair of accounts are
deemed to be similar if they are frequently “co-
mentioned” by the same accounts.
3See http://youtu.be/wf 77z1H-vQ for an explanation of this process.
5) Retweets: From the weighted directed retweet graph,
construct account profile vectors based on the ac-
counts whom they retweet.
6) Retweeted-by: From the weighted directed retweet
graph, construct account profile vectors based on the
accounts that retweet them. Accounts are deemed to
be similar if they are frequently “co-retweeted” by
the same accounts.
7) Co-listed: Based on Twitter list memberships, con-
struct an unweighted bipartite graph, such that an
edge between a list and an account indicates that the
list contains the specified account. A pair of accounts
are deemed to be similar if they are frequently
assigned to the same lists.
Due to the high volume of user-generated video content
associated with the Syria conflict [2], we have also constructed
an additional YouTube channel view. This view reflects the
extent to which pairs of Twitter accounts post tweets containing
links to the same YouTube videos or channels. In this respect,
the view is analogous to the co-listed Twitter view. Note that
we aggregate the YouTube information at the channel level due
to the well-documented existence of authoritative channels [9].
For all of the above views, pairwise similarity values be-
tween account vectors were computed using cosine similarity,
which in turn allowed us to identify each account’s neighbors.
From these neighbor sets, we then produced a single unified
network where each account has at most k = 5 neighbors,
as used previously in [20]. This yielded a network consisting
of 652 nodes and 3,260 edges. We then applied the OSLOM
community detection algorithm to this network [24]. OSLOM
finds overlapping communities, which is appropriate here, as
previous work has shown that partitioning algorithms can fail
to accurately return community structure in social media net-
works [25]. Due to the effect of the resolution parameter P on
the number and size of communities found by OSLOM, where
lower values result in larger numbers of smaller communities,
multiple runs were executed for values of P in [0.1, 0.9]. In
each case we specified that all nodes were to be assigned to
communities. A manual inspection of the communities found
in each run was performed to discover the value of P leading
to the smallest number of larger communities. This led to the
selection of P = 0.8 (higher values led to communities being
overly merged). Details on these communities are provided in
the next section.
To assist in the interpretation of the resulting OSLOM
communities, for each community we generated rankings of
the YouTube channels that were present in the corresponding
member tweets (channels were tweeted directly or indirectly
via specific video URLs). A “profile document” was gener-
ated for each account node, consisting of channel identifiers
extracted from their tweets. These were then represented by
log-based TF-IDF vectors normalized to unit length. For each
community, the subset of vectors for the member accounts was
used to calculate a mean vector D, with the channel ranking
consisting of the top 25 channel identifiers in D. A second set
of community rankings was generated, based on the automatic
Freebase topic annotation of videos by YouTube. A “topic
document” was created for each unique channel that featured in
≥ 1 community channel ranking, consisting of an aggregation
of the English-language labels for all topics assigned to their
C-jihadist
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Fig. 2: The induced subgraph for the three communities selected for detailed analysis: C-jihadist (40 nodes, yellow, left),
C-revolutionary (105 nodes, red, center), and C-moderate (137 nodes, blue, right). Only one node (black) in this subgraph
was assigned to multiple communities (C-revolutionary and C-moderate). This account presents itself as the board of all local
coordination committees in Syria, which comprise activists from a range of religious beliefs and ethnic heritage that report on
events as they occur. Visualization was performed with the Force Atlas layout (repulsion strength = 50.0) in Gephi.
respective uploaded videos. As before, a ranking was generated
from the top topics of the corresponding D vector.
SYRIA COMMUNITY CATEGORIES
We now focus on the communities identified by the com-
plete process described previously. In all, 16 communities
were found, where inspection of inter-community linkage de-
termined the presence of four major categories. The separation
between these categories can be seen in the visualization
produced with the OpenOrd layout in Gephi in Fig. 1 [26],
[27]. The four categories are:
1) Jihadist: three communities that include accounts
with a stated commitment to violent jihadism, includ-
ing accounts associated with or supportive of the al-
Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) and the Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
2) Kurdish: two communities, with one community con-
taining a variety of accounts that include political par-
ties and local media outlets, while the other appears
to be mostly associated with youth movements and
organizations.
3) Pro-Assad: one community, where accounts are pri-
marily used to declare support for the current Syrian
government and armed forces. Notable entities in-
clude the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), a collection
of hackers that target opposition groups and western
websites.
4) Secular/Moderate opposition: ten communities, con-
taining accounts for various opposition entities such
as the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary
and Opposition Forces (Syrian National Coalition)
and the Free Syrian Army (FSA). These communities
constitute a dense core of the network, with many
common channels and topics found within the corre-
sponding community rankings.
The largely Arabic language accounts were categorized
manually on the basis of a lingual and visual analysis of their
content, in addition to analysis of individual egocentric net-
works. There are distinct and immediately apparent differences
recognizable by subject matter experts and Arabic speakers
between the keywords, political and theological concepts, and
symbols used by violent jihadists versus those employed by
pro-Assad accounts, for example [28].
A ranking of the top 25 YouTube channels was produced
for each community, with 295 unique channels found across
all 16 rankings, from a total of 14,629 that were extracted
from tweets. For each of these 295 channels, a random sample
of up to 1,000 uploaded videos was generated, since each
YouTube API call to retrieve videos uploaded by a channel
returns a maximum of 1,000 results. A topic-based vector
was then created using all Freebase topics assigned to this
video sample. The mean percentage of sampled videos having
annotated topics was 59% (σ = 27%) per channel. In total,
185 unique topics were found across the resulting community
topic rankings.
INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITIES
In this section, we offer a detailed analysis of a selection
of communities, based on observation of the associated Twitter
profiles, tweets, retweets, related accounts, YouTube channel
profiles, and uploaded video content. To illustrate the complex-
ity of the situation on the ground, while also demonstrating
how a naı¨ve assumption of a pro/anti-regime polarization is
unsuitable, we have selected three diverse communities within
the anti-regime categories, consisting of two communities
from the Jihadist and Secular/Moderate categories which may
themselves be considered as polar opposites of each other,
with the third community of a far more moderate nature.
These are hereafter referred to as C-jihadist, C-revolutionary
and C-moderate respectively. A visualization of the induced
subgraph for these communities can be found in Fig. 2, where
the edges between C-revolutionary and C-moderate can be
explained by the presence of many secular accounts. Table I
contains the distribution of tweets and followers reported by
Twitter for the three communities. Note that, due to the Twitter
API restrictions effective at the time, only a subset of total
tweets reported were used in the current analysis. Table II
provides an initial insight into all three in terms of the highest-
ranked topics assigned to their preferred YouTube channels.
While the C-revolutionary and C-moderate topics mainly refer
to Syrian cities or provinces, with the Free Syrian Army
featuring strongly for the former, the C-jihadist topics reflect
the community’s agenda with references to The Nusra Front
TABLE I: Statistics reported by Twitter for the accounts in the three communities selected for interpretation.
Community Total Min Max Mean Median Standard deviation
C-revolutionary 5,092,982 22 438,285 48,504 15,889 77,284
C-jihadist 230,712 33 23,705 5,767 2,899 6,339
C-moderate 2,469,995 19 162,989 18,029 10,292 24,252
(a) Tweet statistics.
Community Total Min Max Mean Median Standard deviation
C-revolutionary 5,302,075 58 1,505,272 50,495 10,140 153,416
C-jihadist 489,976 247 79,089 12,249 5,658 17,879
C-moderate 774,917 7 136,297 5,656 2,159 12,832
(b) Follower statistics.
TABLE II: Top ten Freebase topics assigned to the preferred
YouTube channels of the three selected communities.
C-revolutionary C-jihadist C-moderate
Free Syrian Army The Nusra Front Syria
Syria Aleppo Syrian civil war
Homs Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Aleppo
Aleppo Earth Damascus
Damascus Anasheed Free Syrian Army
Idlib Ali Homs
Al-Qusayr Buraidah Bashar al-Assad
Rif Dimashq Governorate Iraq Al-Rastan
Daraa Al-Safira Al-Qusayr
Al-Rastan Al-Qusayr Kafr Batna
and ISIS, the two most important Jihadist groups active in
Syria. The common Al-Qusayr topic refers to the Syrian-
Lebanese border town that is of strategic value to both sides.
C-jihadist is the smallest of the three communities, contain-
ing just 40 accounts. The majority of these are violent jihadist
in their orientation, with a particular affinity evidenced for ISIS
ideology. Language-wise this community is heavily Arabic:
95% of all its accounts are Arabic-only. The ‘black banner’
and other iconography associated with violent jihadism can
be observed, including images of Osama bin Laden. Photos
tweeted by these accounts include many of weaponry and
attacks, also close-ups of ‘martyred’ fighters and a small
number of individuals holding up severed human heads. One
of the accounts with highest follower in-degree claims to be
an official ISIS account, but is not. It is however maintained
by a staunch ISIS supporter, has accumulated nearly 87,000
followers, and provides a link on the account’s marquee to a
Q&A page on jihadist ideology on ask.fm. The majority of
account holders are also active on jihadi forums and reflect
the interlinked nature of this form of propaganda on a wide
range of platforms, including Facebook, YouTube, Instagram,
etc. Twitter is also an important gateway to YouTube for
this community. The highest ranked YouTube channel was
established in summer 2013, has over 6,500 subscribers and 1.7
million total views for 1,000+ videos, most of which reflect
the day-to-day situation on the ground in the mainly Sunni
sectors of Aleppo under attack. This channel is interesting too
because, despite being heavily linked-to by members of this
jihadi community and containing some pro-jihadi content, it
also posts video openly critical of ISIS.
C-revolutionary, containing 105 nodes, is composed largely
of Free Syrian Army (FSA) supporters and sympathizers and
contains the most prolific tweeters of the three communities.
Like C-jihadist, it too is heavily Arabic language-centric, with
some 83% of accounts containing Arabic-only tweets. It also
shares the dissemination of still images of attacks and their
aftermaths, lynchings, and the bodiless heads of alleged non-
Syrian suicide bombers. One of the most prominent accounts is
an official account of the Syrian Revolutionary Forum, which
is explicitly anti-ISIS and paints the current conflict as “from
the sky [we face] the barrels of Bashar [al-Assad] and the
car bombs of al-Baghdadi [ISIS leader] on the ground.” The
account, which has nearly 73,000 followers, also documents
the aftermath of attacks and supplies photographs of uniden-
tified bodies along with requests for help in identifying them.
Another prominent account, which has some 30,000 followers,
is maintained by an individual committed to religious toler-
ance. The user maintaining this account - almost certainly a
male - underlines that the “cross” (i.e. Christianity) is part
of his country and cites verses of the Qur’an to underline
the plurality of faithful people, which he describes as decreed
by God. He also retweets conservative Sunni content however
that is deployed within the jihadi Twittersphere, unfortunately
reflecting real-life grievances and sectarian violence in Syria
(and Iraq). The highest ranked YouTube channel linked-to
from within this community was that of a self-described anti-
regime “news network”. However, the fact that this channel
is no longer accessible demonstrates the potential connection
between social media activity and “real world” consequences.
In this case, it appears that the project’s individual media
activists/citizen journalists became targets for the regime’s
intelligence services in their efforts to shut down this - at the
time - rare professional window into the violence unleashed
against unarmed civilians.
C-moderate is the largest of the three communities, con-
taining 137 accounts, with the majority maintained by a
moderate and largely secular portion of the Syrian opposition
and their supporters whose tweets document the war and its
daily reality on the ground in Syria. Calls for reconciliation
amongst Syrians and/or for so-called ‘foreign fighters’ to quit
Syria can also be observed. It differs from C-revolutionary and
C-jihadist in a number of ways. First, most of the accounts
contain English-only tweets (60%) or are bilingual Arabic-
English (27%). Second, many appear to be members of the
Syrian diaspora, identifying themselves as presently located
not in Syria but elsewhere in the Middle East (e.g. Jordan,
Lebanon, Turkey, UAE), or in the US or Europe. Third, while
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Fig. 3: Video uploads by the preferred YouTube channels of the
three selected communities during Aug-Sept 2013 (69 unique
channels).
C-revolutionary and C-jihadist tweet some images of children,
including those of injured or dead children and babies, these
are the majority of images disseminated by C-moderate. Photos
of fighters or weaponry are rarely observed whereas photos of
the Kafranbel4 banners routinely appear; images of women are
also much more prominent here. The latter may probably be
explained by our observation that users identifying as female
are much more prominent in this community, in comparison
to the others. For example, just one user, a student and
“revolutionist” with 12,000 followers, explicitly identifying as
female appears in C-revolutionary, while no users explicitly
identifying as female are found in C-jihadist. All of the above
points may be illustrated with reference to a central user
(8,000+ followers) who describes herself as a female from
Damascus based in Europe, who tweets in English and posts
images of Syrian children and the Kafranbel banners, but never
pictures of fighters. In general, the accounts here link to major
4Kafranbel is a town in northwestern Syria whose residents have creatively
responded to the Syria conflict by creating and displaying often humorous
signs that express outrage at the world’s indifference to the conflict and that
oppose both the Assad regime and ISIS. Many of the signs are in English.
TABLE III: Top ten Freebase topics assigned to the preferred
YouTube channels of the three selected communities during
the period August 21-29 2013 (the Ghouta chemical weapon
attack took place on 21 August).
C-moderate C-revolutionary C-jihadist
Syria Syria Aleppo
Syrian civil war Free Syrian Army Anasheed
Damascus Levant The Nusra Front
Ghouta Ghouta Eid prayers
Chemical weapon News Al-Bab
Jobar Homs Mosque
Aleppo Aleppo Homs
Bashar al-Assad Rif Dimashq Governorate Dayr Hafir
Chemical warfare Darayya Aleppo International Airport
Al-Rastan Al-Rastan Salaheddine district
Western media sites rather than YouTube. Having said that,
YouTube links are routinely supplied also, with the highest
ranked channel having been established early in the conflict
(i.e. summer 2011). The channel presently has just shy of
4,000 subscribers, including prominent media outlets such as
Al-Jazeera English, and has accumulated over 3.3 million total
views.
A major disparity becomes apparent when a comparison
is undertaken between the volume of uploads for the top 25
YouTube channels linked-to by C-jihadist versus that of both
C-revolutionary and C-moderate as these relate to the “real
world”. There is a particularly striking difference between the
attention, in terms of both reaction time and volume of video
uploaded, paid by both communities to the Ghouta chemical
weapon attack on 21 August 2013. Fig. 3 illustrates that it
took the space of some two days for the C-jihadist preferred
YouTube channels to respond to the attack whereas the re-
sponse by the YouTube channels preferred by C-revolutionary
and C-moderate was immediate. The differences in volume of
video uploaded by the channels are also worth commenting
upon: there was a peak of some 37 videos uploaded on 23
August by the C-jihadist channels, which tapered off again
almost immediately; the corresponding C-revolutionary and
C-moderate channels responded with the upload of over 400
videos on the day of the attack with increased volumes for
some 15 days thereafter. Looking specifically at the period
21-29 August, we found that Freebase topics were assigned to
43%, 45% and 37% of videos uploaded by the C-jihadist, C-
revolutionary and C-moderate channels respectively. The top
ten topics (ranked by TF-IDF as before) for C-revolutionary
and C-moderate topics appear extremely relevant and include
“Ghouta”, “Chemical weapon”, and “Chemical warfare”, while
similar topics were not observed for C-jihadist (Table III).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The Syria conflict has been described as “the most socially
mediated in history” [8]. As multiple platforms are often
employed by protagonists to the conflict and their supporters,
we have analyzed activity on Twitter and YouTube, where an
approach that does not require a prior hypothesis has found
communities of accounts that fall into four identifiable cate-
gories. These categories broadly reflect the complex situation
on the ground in Syria [6], contrasting with the relatively
static nature of mainstream groupings that were the focus of
other studies of online political activism. A detailed analysis
of selected anti-regime communities has been provided, where
rankings of preferred YouTube channels and associated Free-
base topics were used to assist interpretation. Resources such
as the latter can help to overcome some of the multilingual
obstacles encountered in this context, while also addressing the
interpretation issues that can exist with graph-based analysis
[14].
We emphasize once more the difficulties involved in ana-
lyzing certain online political situations, due to a scarcity in
the prior knowledge that is commonly available to mainstream
political analysis. Here we have focused on a set of actors
that have been deemed authoritative, as this approach has been
taken elsewhere in the analysis of online Syrian activity [9].
The meaningful results found with close reading of tweet,
video and other content demonstrate the value of “small data”,
where valuable research insights can be found at any level
[29], while also complementing results found with analysis of
larger data sets associated with the conflict [8]. In future work,
we would like to continue this approach for further analysis
of these groups, with a view to monitoring the flux in group
structure and ideology.
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